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DIRECTORS
This was not a simple proposition. When pen was put to paper, the movement of an airplane flying through three dimensions of space at 300 miles per hour conjured the specter of algebra and trigonometry. The dilemma was further complicated by the facts of real world artillery. Antiaircraft shells were subject to the effects of atmospheric conditions, gravity and other basic laws of physics. These calculations were beyond the scope of most servicemen. Besides, who had time to work math problems or consult firing tables when a hostile aircraft was threatening? Enemy airplanes needed to be engaged immediately and the window of opportunity was too short to permit time for the slide rule.
Yes, good gunners could develop their abilities and learn to lead their prey, just like an adept duck or pheasant hunter. Indeed, many automatic weapons gunners (using 37mm, 40mm and .50 caliber guns) became quite skilled at firing on aircraft at shorter ranges using gun sights and adjusting their shooting by observing a stream of tracers. However, because of the much longer reach of the bigger guns and their use of projectiles with timed fuzes, direct fire sights would not work. Besides, antiaircraft doctrine demanded all possible accuracy from the big guns on the first shot. By the time the detonation of that first round was observed, the engagement could well be half over. There was little time to adjust fire visually. Fortunately, the heavy antiaircraft guns had available an accurate technological solution - the director.
The director was essentially a mechanical computer designed to calculate firing solutions for and transmit pointing data to antiaircraft guns. Although this may seem quite advanced for the time period, the first antiaircraft director was adopted by the U.S. Army in 1917. Of course, during the interwar period and throughout the duration of the World War II, director technology continued to advance. By the later part of the war, electromechanical computers were able to calculate highly accurate firing solutions directly from data provided by radar sets.
Directors, from the very first models, were very similar in basic operation. The altitude or slant range of the enemy aircraft was determined or estimated, then entered into the director. Two observers would then track the aircraft through a pair of telescopes on opposite sides of the device. These trackers kept the airplane image on their respective crosshairs by turning handwheels, thereby providing the director with data on the aircraft's change in elevation and azimuth in relation to the director. As the mechanisms inside the director responded to the rotation of these handwheels, a firing solution was mechanically calculated and continuously updated for as long as the target was tracked. The director essentially predicted future position based on the aircraft's present location and how it was moving. Directors soon incorporated correction factors that could compensate for ballistic conditions such as air density, wind velocity and wind direction. If the director was not located near the guns, a correction for parallax error could also be entered into the device to produce even more accurate calculations.
As radar technology developed at a seemingly exponential rate during World War II, its increasing capabilities were incorporated into director fire control technology, eventually rendering unnecessary visual observation of a target.
The M4 and M7 fire control directors provided solutions for 3-inch and 90mm antiaircraft guns. The two directors were very similar in appearance and capability, with the M7 having a better ability to track diving or climbing aircraft. The M7 also incorporated a correction for dead time, which is the interval between when a projectile's fuze time is set and when the round is actually fired. In normal employment, a single director simultaneously provided firing data to all four guns of a battery. The M7 required a squad leader and five operators, while the M4 managed with one less soldier. (The updated A1B2 versions of both directors required an additional two men.) As with all directors, these boxes need to be oriented and calibrated properly. When handled correctly and provided with smooth tracking data by the operators, the M4 and M7 produced very satisfactory results.
"Handle your director as gently as you do your watch. Care for it as thoroughly as you do your car. Rely on it as assuredly as you do your rifle." Antiaircraft Artillery Field Manual FM 4-136
Automatic weapons units had the option of several types of on-carriage sights for their weapons. They were also allocated a smaller, simpler, and somewhat lighter director for off-carriage fire control of these guns. Standardized in January 1941, the M5 director was an Americanized version of the British Kerrison Predictor. The M5 was much less complex that its heftier cousins for several reasons. Since automatic weapons used shells that detonated on contact, fuze time calculations were not required. The M5 was always set up within 15 feet of the weapon it controlled, so parallax correction was unnecessary. Furthermore, this model of director was not capable of receiving range data from external optical height finders or radar sets. Predictably, the M5 had fewer external cable connections and was operated by a smaller crew of just three men. An M6 version of the director was manufactured for use with British guns and equipment.
The M5 director could be set up for use with either the 37mm or 40mm antiaircraft guns by changing internal cams. Unlike the M4 and M7 directors that provided firing data for a four-gun battery, the M5 was designed to train a single gun by remote control, necessitating one director for each gun.
During stateside training, it was stressed that the M5 director improved firing accuracy by a 5:1 ratio. Naturally, its use was emphatically encouraged. In the field, however, feelings were mixed. Early reports from AAA units in North Africa enthusiastically lauded the director and soldiers placed "great confidence" in the box. Other automatic weapons units were frustrated because they were barely able to emplace their director and gun before receiving orders to move. By the time First Army was ready to invade Europe on D-Day, that organization's antiaircraft commanders decided to leave their M5 directors in England for the assault. First Army stressed that a field army required highly mobile antiaircraft units. They opined that the 500-pound M5 directors, along with the accompanying generators and remote control equipment, had a great potential to slow the movement of 40mm fire units, thus offsetting any gains in firing accuracy. Therefore, First Army opted for on-carriage control and favored the British Stiffkey Stick for gun aiming. Other commands, on the contrary, used the M5 director variants with varying degrees of satisfaction for the duration of the war. As the war progressed, the M5 directors were increasingly set aside in favor of on-carriage fire control devices such as the M7 computing sight, also known as the Weissight. However, it was common practice for an AA battery to have a portion of their 40mm guns utilize the directors while the remaining pieces operated on sight control.
One of the chief criticisms of the M5 and the self-synchronous M5A1 design was that the director required operators to estimate the slant range to an enemy aircraft, as the director was not designed to receive such data from an external source. The accuracy of the calculated firing solution depended on the skill of the human estimator and his ability to adjust his approximation by observing a tracer stream. To offset this disadvantage, an M5A2 model was developed that mounted an integral 30-inch optical base range finder designed to feed continuous present slant range data to the director. This was essentially a miniature height finder attached to the director. Unfortunately, the improved device only made it to a handful of battalions before the war concluded.
Unlike a gun battalion's director, the M5 could not accept present position data from radar sets. This made unseen firing and night firing impractical for automatic weapons units, except under very unusual circumstances. A new T25 experimental radar director for automatic weapons was in development, but was just undergoing field tests by a single AAA group during the waning stages of the war.
Although this new system could be integrated with older ranging equipment, the true advantages became evident when the M9 was tied directly to a radar set, especially the SCR-584 which was developed concurrently with the M9. In this scenario, the tracker and altitude converter were completely bypassed, the cabling simplified, and the system provided with a continuous stream of easily digested, accurate position information from the radar. Visual spotting of an aircraft was no longer necessary. Targets could now be engaged from below a low cloud ceiling or at night without illumination from searchlights. It was the first light from the dawn of a new day in air defense.
One vital piece of information required by all fire control directors was the altitude or slant range of an enemy aircraft, a variable necessary for its antiaircraft firing calculations. The director itself was unable to determine altitude, so an external ranging device was essential. Developed in the 1920s, the telescope-like optical height finder was the solution. As the war progressed, altitude information was increasingly provided by various models of radar. In fact, Third Army AAA organizations never used their optical height finders in Europe and recommended their elimination. However, even though the new radio technology was more accurate and less limited by visibility than the optical method, height finders could still be useful. Once the radar had assisted the director crew in getting "on target" visually, the optical height finder could be switched in to provide altitude while the radar was then freed to search for other targets.
The Army's war-era M1 and M2 height finders were stereoscopic range finders, working on the same principle that enables a pair of human eyes to perceive depth. An image of the enemy aircraft was produced by two lenses 13.5 feet apart. This image was matched to a reticle by the stereoscopic observer (at his center observation position on the telescope) until both airplane and the reticle appeared to be at the same distance in his viewfinder. The readings at this point accurately calculated the range to the target. Range was converted to altitude by simple trigonometry. The observed range (slant range) was the length of the hypotenuse of a right triangle. The vertical leg of this triangle corresponded to the aircraft's altitude. The elevation of the height finder (angular height) provided the angle needed to solve for altitude. The height finder continuously resolved the calculation and automatically sent the data to the director by means of a cable connection.
The SCR-547 was a hybrid radar-optical unit designed to provide directors with altitude or slant range. The target aircraft first needed to be spotted in the optical scopes of the SCR-547, where it was visually tracked in azimuth and angular height. Once the enemy aircraft was properly sighted, the unit transmitted a narrow radio pulse on a 10 centimeter wavelength. This pulse reflected off the target aircraft back to the SCR-547. Slant range was determined by round trip time of the pulse. Altitude data was calculated and sent to the director by a repeater. The unit could measure a maximum altitude near 30,000 feet, but this was dependent on the aircraft being visible. Since the SCR-545 and SCR-584 radars were able to send all present position information to directors for both seen and unseen aircraft, the advantages of the SCR-547 height finder were short lived.
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© Copyright 2009 Brian L. Brooks
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